A public good is produced if and only if a volunteer provides it. There are many pure-strategy Nash equilibria in each of which a single player volunteers. Noisy strategy revisions (for instance, quantal responses) allow play to evolve. Equilibrium selection is achieved via the characterisation of long-run play as revisions approximate best replies. The volunteer need not be the lowest-cost player: relatively high-cost, but nonetheless "reliable" players may instead produce the public good. More efficient players provide when higher values are associated with lower costs. Voluntary open-source software provision offers a contemporary application. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
The volunteer's dilemma
A public good is produced if and only if at least one player volunteers to provide it. There are many pure-strategy Nash equilibria involving voluntary provision by a single player. An equilibrium-selection problem arises: who will volunteer?
Studies of the symmetric version of this familiar game (Diekmann, 1985) have often focused on the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium and its Bayesian-Nash counterpart for incompleteinformation games (Weesie, 1994; Johnson, 2002) . Such mixed equilibria have counter-intuitive and counter-evidential properties. An (even slightly) asymmetric volunteer's dilemma exemplifies: players with low provision costs volunteer with low probability in order to maintain others' indifference. 1 This is somewhat absurd. This paper selects a pure-strategy equilibrium via the study of evolving play: strategies are periodically revised by players who usually choose myopic best replies to the current state of play, but occasionally "mutate" against the flow of play (Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993) . If a revising player chooses to volunteer even when another has already, the process experiences a low probability "birth." Similarly, if a revising player chooses not to volunteer when there is no other provider, then the process experiences a "death."
Any failures to play best replies can be interpreted as equiprobable mistakes. Here, however, a state-dependent specification, which encompasses quantal-response strategy revisions, ensures that the probability of a birth or a death can respond to payoffs. 2 For instance, if a player's cost of volunteering is low then any idiosyncratic benefit from the act of volunteering may overwhelm it; a birth is more likely. Similarly, a volunteer is less likely to die when the public good is highly prized. Birth and death probabilities also depend upon the relative noise in a player's revisions. Under the usual random-utility interpretation, a player with particularly variable payoffs will fail to play a best reply with relatively high probability.
Proposition 1 characterises long-run play when strategy revisions approximate myopic best replies. The player who volunteers in the equilibrium thus selected need not experience the lowest cost. Rather, a combination of enthusiasm (relatively high birth probability) and reliability (relatively low death probability) determines who will provide the public good. Proposition 2 reveals that when enthusiasm and reliability are more positively associated looking across the set of players, then the cost paid in the selected equilibrium is lower.
The evolution of voluntary action
In a simultaneous-move n-player binary-action game, player i selects z i ∈ {0, 1}, where z i = 1 represents "volunteering." Looking forward to the strategy-revision process described below, the pure-strategy profile z is described as a "state of play" in the state space Z ≡ {0, 1} n .
In a volunteer's dilemma, a public good is provided if and only if at least one player undertakes the costly burden of producing it. Therefore, a player has an incentive to volunteer if and only if no other player does so. This game emerges from the payoff specification
1 This is a common feature of related games including the textbook game of chicken (n = 2 here) or the classic war of attrition (Bliss and Nalebuff, 1984; Gradstein, 1992; Gradstein, 1994) in which provision is delayed until a player volunteers. In a global-game (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993) version of the asymmetric chicken game there is a unique equilibrium that approximates one of the (asymmetric) pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Similarly, under a wide variety of equilibrium-selection devices, asymmetric wars of attrition instantly end with the concession of one player (Kornhauser et al., 1989; Riley, 1999; Myatt, 2003) . 2 Quantal responses (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) were exploited by Blume (1995 Blume ( , 1997 Blume ( , 2003 and Blume and Durlauf (2001) , who studied logit-driven evolution (one of the specifications considered here). The pure-strategy Nash equilibria are the subset Z 1 ⊂ Z of n states in which a single player provides. Attention turns to evolving play. At each time t the state of play z t ∈ Z is updated via a one-step-at-a-time strategy-revision process: a player i is randomly selected and responds to the current play of others. This generates a Markov chain on Z. The transitions involve single steps up and down in the state space. A step up is the "birth" of a new volunteer, and is a (myopic) best reply by the revising player if z t+1 ∈ Z 1 ; that is, whenever there are no other volunteers. Otherwise, a birth is against the flow of play. Similarly, a step down is the "death" of an existing volunteer; this is against the flow of play when z t ∈ Z 1 .
If strategy revisions were myopic best replies then the process would lock in to pure-strategy equilibria. Here, however, revisions are occasionally against the flow of play: player i volunteers with some birth probability b ε i > 0 even when other providers exist; similarly, player i ceases to be the lone volunteer (or fails to volunteer when no other player is doing so) with some death probability d ε i > 0. Such "mutations" allow play to escape from Nash equilibria and move around the state space. The strategy-revision process is an ergodic Markov chain, and a unique stationary distribution reveals how often each state is played in the long run.
The birth and death probabilities are indexed by a noise parameter ε > 0, and satisfy b ε i → 0 and d ε i → 0 as ε → 0. Thus, for small ε, strategy revisions approximate best replies, and most time is spent in the Nash-equilibrium states. A standard approach (Foster and Young, 1990; Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993) is to examine the limit of the ergodic distribution as ε → 0, when it places all weight on a "stochastically stable" subset of states; when this subset is a single pure-strategy equilibrium then that equilibrium is "selected."
One possibility is b ε i = d ε i = ε, so that ε is a state-independent error probability. This approach is not fruitful here, since evolution treats the players symmetrically; each member of Z 1 attracts probability 1/n as ε → 0. 4 Instead, these birth and death probabilities differ from each other and across players, and are "state dependent" in the sense of Bergin and Lipman (1996) : they decline at different rates as noise is reduced. This means that the ratio of any two distinct birth or death probabilities either explodes or vanishes as ε → 0.
Some formal notation is useful here. For two functions f (ε) > 0 and g(ε) > 0, write
When f (ε) and g(ε) both vanish as ε → 0, then they decline at the same rate if f (ε) g(ε), and
Given that this is so, it is without loss of generality to label players so that b ε
n for all ε small enough: player 1 experiences the highest birth probability and is the most enthusiastic; the remaining players are ordered by declining enthusiasm. Turning to deaths, it is assumed that 
Strategy revisions as quantal responses
The model of state-dependent mutations considered here arises naturally when revising players choose quantal responses in the sense popularised by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) . For instance, the choice of a revising player arises from a logit quantal response when
Logit responses approximate best replies when ε → 0. The rates at which b ε i and d ε i vanish depend on the payoffs; for instance, b ε i b ε j if and only if c i < c j . Hence, ordering players by decreasing enthusiasm is equivalent to ordering them by efficiency: c 1 < · · · < c n , so that the most enthusiastic player experiences the lowest cost of provision. Similarly, player i is more reliable than player j (so that
Clearly, if all players value the public good in the same way, then a more enthusiastic player is also more reliable. However, when valuations differ the most enthusiastic player may be unreliable.
The specification in (3) carries a random-utility interpretation: if the incentive of a player to volunteer is perturbed by a logistic error, then the logit is obtained. Of course, other randomutility specifications are available. Suppose, for instance, that the payoffs of a revising player are perturbed by normal noise, so
Writing ρ i for the correlation coefficient betweenc i andṽ i , this probit specification yields Reliability is also influenced by the correlation between players' costs of provision and valuations for the public good. For instance, holding other parameters constant across the player set,
Reliability is enhanced by positive correlation between cost and value shocks: any short-term increase in provision cost is tempered by a contemporaneously high valuation for the public good.
Long-run play
When ε is small, play almost always follows the direction of best reply and tends to "lock in" to pure-strategy Nash equilibria. These n states in Z 1 form (singleton) limit sets from which a noiseless (pure myopic best reply) strategy-revision process cannot escape. As ε vanishes, however, only a stochastically stable subset Z † ⊆ Z 1 retains weight in the ergodic distribution. This section characterises the stochastically stable set and identifies the players who, for vanishing noise and as part of long-run play, volunteer to provide the public good.
This stochastically stable set Z † consists of the states in Z 1 that are hardest to leave. For z ∈ Z 1 , there are two methods of escape: the active player i satisfying z i = 1 is selected to revise, dies with probability d ε i , and is replaced; or some other j = i is selected to revise, volunteers with probability b ε j , and so supplants i. For the latter escape route, the most likely replacement is the most enthusiastic of j = i. Hence, for vanishing noise, the probability of leaving z is determined by max [ 
For case (i), d ε r b ε 1 implies that deaths are always more likely than births. The quickest exit is always a death, and so the most reliable player is selected to volunteer.
For case (ii), b ε 1 d ε 1 implies that player 1 finds it easier to volunteer than to quit. An exit from an equilibrium state with a volunteer j = 1 must be at least as easy as the birth of player 1.
, it is harder to escape from the equilibrium in which the most enthusiastic player is active. Under (homoskedastic) logit or probit specifications, case (ii) entails the efficient (lowest cost) provision of the public good.
For case (iii), there are equilibrium states from which the easiest exit is via a birth. These states involve reliable volunteers for whom any unreliability is overwhelmed by the enthusiasm of player 1. Such states are equally robust for vanishing noise and share positive weight in the limit; since d ε 1 b ε 1 , player 1 is too unreliable to participate in the set of activists.
Enthusiasm and reliability
One natural configuration is when enthusiasts are reliable:
Under logit quantalresponse (3) this happens when valuations are symmetric: v i = v for all i. The activist is the most enthusiastic player and the most efficient provider. On the other hand, enthusiasts might be unre-
Under random-utility specifications enthusiasm can stem from particularly high-variance payoff shocks; but high variances can also lessen reliability. A possibly high-cost but low-variance "plodder" may solve the volunteer's dilemma, since the relatively low-cost "star" is too unreliable to contribute consistently.
This discussion suggests that a positive association between enthusiasm and reliability favours the activism of enthusiasts. Since players are labelled via decreasing birth probability, this relationship is determined by the order of their death probabilities. To measure formally the degree to which death probabilities are ordered (and hence assess the enthusiasm-reliability association)
for a set of death probabilities, andd ≡ {d ε i } n i=1 for a permutation of this set: 
is how many of the y most reliable players occupy one of the first x slots on the player list; it measures how well-ordered the death probabilities are. Equivalently, it is how many of the y most reliable players are also amongst the x most enthusiastic; this is the association of enthusiasm and reliability. 
Proposition 2. An increase in the association of enthusiasm and reliability (formally, an orderimproving permutation of death probabilities) favours the activism of enthusiasts.
If low birth costs arise from low values of c i , this result can be interpreted in terms of efficiency: an order-increasing permutation lowers the cost paid in the selected equilibrium.
To illustrate, adopt the logit specification (3) and consider "shifting value" from one player to another. Suppose that players i and j satisfy c i < c j and v i − c i < v j − c j ; hence i is more enthusiastic but less reliable than
, and note that v < v j . Now move v utility (shifting value) from j to i so that new valuations are given
This pairwise switch of the players' death probabilities is an order-improving permutation. By Proposition 2, the activist must be (at least weakly) more enthusiastic hence experience a weakly lower provision cost. So, if utility is transferable in this way, it is efficiency enhancing to shift value from high-cost players to low-cost players.
Implications
The volunteer's dilemma is a simple yet important game. The voluntary development of opensource software provides a contemporary application. Johnson (2002) models this problem as an incomplete-information volunteer's dilemma. Rather than address the equilibrium-selection problem, he instead provided a careful characterisation of the symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in which the probability that the players volunteer is decreasing in the correlation between their cost and value parameters.
The focus here is on selection between the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. It might be expected that, owing to asymmetries in payoffs, the activist would be a player with relatively low costs. 7 To measure formally the enthusiasm-reliability association write y for the rank of a player's reliability and x for the rank of the player's enthusiasm. Thus b ε (x) is the xth highest birth probability, and d ε (y) is the yth lowest death probability. The joint distribution of x and y is an empirical copula:
The penultimate equality follows because players are ordered via decreasing birth probability. The copula captures any association between birth and death probabilities. A measure of this association is concordance: (b,d) is more concordant than (b, d) if and only if C xy (b,d) C xy (b, d) for all x and y, which implies an increase in the standard empirical measures of association, such as Spearman's ρ and Kendall's τ .
However, the result is more subtle: the activist is either the most "enthusiastic" player (case (ii) in Proposition 1), or the most "reliable" player(s) (cases (i) and (iii) in Proposition 1).
Interpreting strategy revisions as quantal responses, an enthusiast has a relatively low cost parameter. Enthusiasm is associated with efficiency, and it is socially optimal for the activist to be the most enthusiastic player. If b ε i d ε j for all i and j then enthusiasm "overwhelms" reliability, and this is indeed true; case (ii) applies here. Alternatively, efficiency is attained when the relatively enthusiastic players are also relatively reliable (Proposition 2).
Negative association between b ε i and d ε i might be understood as negative correlation between v i and c i "across" the players, and efficiency is enhanced if those who value the good highly find it cheapest to provide: shifting value to lower-cost players reduces the cost paid in the selected equilibrium. Returning to the open-source software example, networking utilities might exhibit negative correlation between v i and c i since skilled programmers find them useful. On the other hand, word processors might exhibit positive correlation since often programmers are not end users. These observations resonate with the aforementioned comparative static of Johnson (2002) , who argued that value-cost correlation provides a resolution to the "puzzle in the open source community [ . . . ] why some obviously useful software does not get written [ . . . ] while open source word processors and spreadsheets do exist, it is fair to say that only recently have they begun to be comparable in quality to, for example, Microsoft Office. On the other hand, hundreds of other free utilities and applications exist."
It is interesting to distinguish this effect from correlation "within" payoffs. Consider the specification in (4): high ρ i ceteris paribus implies low d ε i and favours the overwhelming effect described above (a high draw of c i , which might have led to a death, is likely contemporaneous to a counteractively high draw of v i , implying improved reliability). Efficiency is favoured by negative correlation "across" the panel of players and positive correlation "within."
Finally, consider "sharing costs" when more than one player volunteers (perhaps, if k players volunteer, each player pays their cost with probability 1/k). Since this has no effect upon the bestreply structure of the game, the same analysis applies. The difference is that the cost of player i contributing when a single other player j already provides the good drops from c i to c i /2. Under a quantal-response interpretation, this has no impact on the death probabilities, but simply raises all of the birth probabilities. This provides an alternative source for the overwhelming effect described above, and thus favours efficiency.
Another interesting alteration that might be made to the game involves requiring the contributions of many individuals to provide the public good successfully. In this case, the game becomes a threshold public-good provision game (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984) in which m out of n players must volunteer to provide the good. The best-reply structure is now changed; further analysis is in a companion paper (Myatt and Wallace, 2006) . Q(z , z) and so
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(A.6)
The various equalities are from Kemeny and Snell (1960, Ch. 6) Proof. There are transitions from z / ∈ Z 1 into some z ∈ Z 1 with probability bounded away from zero as ε → 0, and hence Q(z , z) is bounded away from zero. As ε → 0 the probability of escape from z vanishes and so W (z) → ∞. Employing (A.6), p(z)/p(z ) → ∞ and so p(z ) → 0. 2 where the limit follows from b ε new activists are members ofM ≡ {i | b ε
